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ABSTRACT
Title of research paper: How to break the monopoly in port industry?OW TO
BREAK THE MONOPOLY IN PORT INDUSTRY?

Degree:

MSc

In recent years, Chinese ports have developed rapidly, and the throughput of many
ports is among the highest in the world. In April 2017, the national development and
reform commission (NDRC) and the ministry of communications has carried on the
antitrust investigations to Shanghai port and Tianjin port, in September, it added
Ningbo port and Qingdao port and other 37 port to the antitrust investigations, until
November 15, the national development and reform commission held a press
conference. The investigation found that several Chinese ports were suspected of
monopolistic practices and used their advantages to gain illegitimate benefits. The
problems of some port enterprises suspected of violating the anti-monopoly law
mainly include restricting the use of tugboats, cargo handling and shipping services
provided by local subsidiaries. For non-competitive local foreign trade container
handling services, much higher than the competitive international transit container
handling fees; Adding unreasonable trading conditions such as forced unpacking and
packing, non-competition clauses, loyalty clauses, etc.

On June 11, 2018, the state administration for market regulation made an
administrative penalty decision on the monopolistic agreements reached and
implemented by four tug companies in Shenzhen. Since 2010, these four companies
had made communication with other port tug company and made the tugboat price
iv

consistent. All these behaviors are restricting the relevant market competition,
affecting the business environment of fair competition, leading to high prices of
related services, increasing the operating costs of the real economy, and disturbing
the market order.

Thus it can be seen that Chinese ports do have monopoly. In a large number of
literatures, most scholars have also mentioned that port monopoly harms the
development of port economy, and port should establish an effective system and fair
competition

This paper combines antitrust cases in foreign country with Chinese cases, analyses
the advantage of foreign advanced system of port, and then on the basis of port group
of definition, the 37 regional port can be divided into Bohai rim port group, the
Yangtze river delta port group, Pearl river delta port group, southeast coastal port
group, southwest port group, then gather the throughput of container between 2007
and 2017, using of market concentration, the CRn Index, Entropy Index and
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index analysis the architecture evolution of the port
group ,then, I can get the following conclusion: the architecture from of Chinese
container port group was from centralized to decentralized, competition between
ports group will be more intense. The Chinese port group will develop into a
three-pronged port group system with the Yangtze river delta port group, pearl river
delta port group and Bohai rim port group

Then, by analyzing the functional distribution and resource integration of foreign
port groups, it can bring valuable experience of construction and development to
Chinese port groups. At the same time, this paper analyzes Chinese port monopoly
v

and finds that Chinese port operation mechanism is not perfect, Chinese
antimonopoly law is not perfect and the problem of port operators concentration.
Finally, it puts forward some suggestions on how to break the port monopoly.

Key words: Port Monopoly; HHI; Port group; Antitrust law

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration ................................................................................................................ iii
Foreword.................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract...................................................................................................................... iv
Table of contents ...................................................................................................... vii
List of table ................................................................................................................. x
List of figure .............................................................................................................. xi
List of Abbreviation ................................................................................................. xii
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background ........................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Literature review ................................................................................................ 2
2. Competition and monopoly of port industry in China. ...................................... 5
2.1 Trend analysis..................................................................................................... 5
2.2 The monopolistic behavior of port enterprise. ................................................... 6
2.2.1 Joint restrictions on competition by port enterprises. .................................. 7
2.2.2 Port enterprises abusing their economic advantage to sell .......................... 7
2.2.3 The price discrimination of the service provided by the port enterprise ..... 7
2.3Analysis and attitude of scholars at home and abroad on port monopoly .......... 8
3. The history of anti-monopoly of domestic ports ............................................... 10
3.1 Nanjing port tally dispute ................................................................................. 11
3.2 Thirteen shipowners' associations set up charging committees ....................... 12
3.3 Price monopoly case of Shenzhen tugboat companies .................................... 14
4. Case study on foreign port monopoly ................................................................ 16
4.1 Excessive price--The Helsingborg port case .................................................... 16
4.2 Discriminatory price---MERCI case in Italy .................................................... 18
4.3 Non-price abuse—Holyhead case in Britain .................................................... 19
vii

5. Chinese port analysis ........................................................................................... 21
5.1 The data collection ........................................................................................... 22
5.2 Methods select .................................................................................................. 25
5.2.1 Method---CRn ........................................................................................... 26
5.2.2 Method---HHI............................................................................................ 27
5.2.3 Method---Entropy Index ............................................................................ 28
5.3 Results analysis ................................................................................................ 29
6 Worldwide port competition and cooperation ................................................... 33
6.1 New York - New Jersey port group ................................................................. 33
6.2 European port group: European harbor organization ....................................... 34
6.3 Tokyo bay port group ....................................................................................... 36
6.4 Haracteristics of port group development ........................................................ 37
6.4.1 Unified and coordinated ............................................................................ 37
6.4.2 Extensive cooperation ............................................................................... 38
6.4.3 Clear division of labor and dislocation development ................................ 38
6.4.4 Differentiated cooperation ......................................................................... 39
6.4.5 Ensure the autonomy of port operation ..................................................... 39
6.4.6 Downplay administrative divisions ........................................................... 40
7. Analysis of Chinese port monopoly .................................................................... 40
7.1 The problem with the running mechanism....................................................... 40
7.2 The problem with the concentration of port operators ..................................... 42
7.3 The deficiency of antimonopoly law in China ................................................. 43
7.3.1 The defects of the multisectoral law enforcement system ......................... 43
7.3.2 The relationship between law enforcement and regulators is unclear ....... 45
8. Suggestions ........................................................................................................... 46
8.1 To improve the operation mechanism .............................................................. 46
viii

8.1.1 To improve the operating mode of the horizontal separation .................... 47
8.1.2 To separate the port vertically ................................................................... 48
8.1.3 To optimize the resource allocation .......................................................... 49
8.2 To improve the system of concentration of port operators .............................. 51
8.2.1 Substantive review..................................................................................... 51
8.2.2 Port operation market access analysis ....................................................... 52
8.2.3 Participate in determining market share of port operators ........................ 53
8.2.4 The influence of concentration of operators on consumers....................... 54
8.2.5 The influence of concentration of operators on economy ......................... 54
8.3 To improve the relevant legal system .............................................................. 56
8.3.1 To improve relevant laws and regulations on anti-monopoly law ............ 56
8.3.2 To strengthen the authority of antitrust authorities ................................... 57
8.3.3 To unify the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies ............................ 58
9. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 58
10. Reference ............................................................................................................ 60

ix

LIST OF TABLE
Table 1 The throughput of Yangtze river delta port group from 2007 to 2017 ........ 23
Table 2 The throughput of peral river delta port group from 2007 to 2017 .............. 23
Table 3 The throughput of Bohai rim port group from 2007 to 2017 ....................... 24
Table 4 The throughput of southwest port group from 2007 to 2017 ....................... 24
Table 5 The throughput of southeast port group from 2007 to 2017 ........................ 25
Table 6 The CRn Index of market structure classification by American economist
Bain ............................................................................................................................ 26
Table 7 The CRn values of the Chinese container port group and the five container
port group ................................................................................................................... 27
Table 8 The HHI indicators issued by U.S. department of justice ............................ 28
Table 9 The HHI values of the Chinese container port group and the five container
port group ................................................................................................................... 28
Table 10 The Entropy Indexes of the Chinese container port group and the five
container port group ................................................................................................... 29
Table 11 Different port planning in Tokyo port group ............................................. 37

x

LIST OF FIGURE
Figure 1 The distribution of coastal port group in China.......................................... 23
Figure 2 The trend of the three port group’s market share from 2007 to 2017 ........ 30
Figure 3 The Entropy Index of the five port group from 2007 to 2017 .................... 31
Figure 4 New York-New Jersey port group competition and cooperation
organization model .................................................................................................... 34
Figure 5 The organization model of port competition and cooperation in northwest
Europe ........................................................................................................................ 35

xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATION
TEU

Twenty-feet Equivalent Unit

HHI

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

CRn

Concentration Ratio

EI

Entropy Index

xii

1. Introduction
1.1 Background
On November 15, 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
said in a news release on the basis of Shanghai port, Tianjin port claimed monopoly
investigation, the national development and reform commission jointly with the
ministry of transport. China port association jointly held a meeting on September 22,
which is asking the country’s coastal 39 port to control the antitrust investigation and
find problems, conduct self-check and rectification. All of these require port
enterprises to realize the importance of fair competition, which is to promote port
authors efficiency in production and management, better service entity economic
development. In the survey it is found that part of the port enterprise is suspected of
violation of the anti-monopoly law, which mainly includes forcing the shipping
company to use the tug, cargo, shipping and other services provided by the
designated port subsidiaries. For the uncompetitive local foreign trade container
handling business, the charge is far higher than that of the competitive international
transit container. Unreasonable trading conditions such as forced unpacking,
non-compete clause and loyalty clause are attached to the transaction object. These
behaviors exclude and restrict the related market competition, and affect the business
environment of fair competition, leading to high prices of related services and
increasing the operating costs of the real economy. The port monopoly is to point to
the port to take advantage of its own advantageous position to obtain illegitimate
benefit.

We know that although the monopoly has certain advantages. For instance, the
quantity of goods can be allocated reasonably. Moreover, the monopolist can control
1

the port loading and unloading. It will not cause duplicative construction. However,
the disadvantages brought by the port monopoly cannot be ignored. For example,
monopolists control the market price and form a strong position and seller's market.
Lack of competition in the market of port enterprises is no longer under pressure to
promote efficiency, in turn, affecting the overall efficiency of regional logistics chain
issues, which leads to the poor quality of service and customer satisfaction, etc.
At present, with the acceleration of the global economic integration process, the port
is an important facility for international trade, and its role and status are becoming
increasingly prominent. Under the support of our government, many ports in China
became bigger in a few short years that also formed the link Bohai sea, Yangtze river
delta, the pearl river delta and coastal areas of southeast coast and the southwest five
port groups.

1.2 Literature review
First, study on the competition of port cooperation by scholars. Shi Xin (2001) in
port cooperation game analysis from the perspective of game theory in the study of
port cooperation conditions, points out that to bring economic benefits to the ports of
port cooperation is an important business strategy; Zhuang Peijun (2005) in container
port competition strategic research analyzed and thought that the cause of container
port competition is intense, which can be used for competition and cooperation
competition strategy of cooperation, in order to improve the competitiveness and
market power; Li Nan (2006) in the port strategic trend of synergetic competition
identified the relationship between monopoly and competition and he held the view
that regional port from confrontational competition to cooperative competition can
improve the comprehensive competitiveness of regional port group. Competition and
cooperation will make the port competitive advantage. Shen Chen-guang (2011) in
2

the operation mode reform of monopoly industries in China - in the port industry,
analyzed the operation mode of the port industry and expounded the operation mode
of the natural monopoly industry. The operation mode of the port enterprises to port
the product quantity, quality and service has a huge impact. For instance, port should
meet their actual situation to choose the appropriate operating model; Notteboom, et
al. (2001) pointed out in Container Shipping and Ports that cooperation between
ports can enhance the competitiveness of ports in the region, thus enhancing the
market share of cooperative ports.

Second, it can be seen from some domestic and foreign port case analysis, such as He
Jianyun, et al. (1999) in the western European port cooperation experience and
enlightenment, analyzing the Benelux port system and European seaport organization
of operation. He summarized the experiences of Western Europe port cooperation
and put forward the enlightenment of Yangtze river delta port cooperation; Chen
Miao, et al. (2007) in the foreign port group of competitive cooperation
enlightenment to China, analyzed the American New York and New Jersey port
group, European ports group, Japan's Tokyo bay port group cooperation experience,
as Chinese port group cooperation proposed. Li Yan , et al. (2012) in the Bohai rim
port cooperation mechanism research, in the perspective of cooperative game theory,
analysis of the Bohai rim port cooperation, from the angle of cooperative game
theory proposed that the regional port cooperation mechanism suggestion; Wang
Yinyin (2014) in the Yangtze river delta port group competition development strategy
research analyzed of current situation of the development of Yangtze river delta port
group, put forward the scientific orientation, resource sharing and collaborative
governance promote port group of cooperation competition countermeasures.
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Third, it indicates some relevant legal research on port monopoly. For example, Liu
Bin (2011) in the port integration in the concentration of anti-monopoly law analysis
points out that the port concentration is a double-edged sword. Excessive
concentration degree will reduce the port operation market competition. All of those
eliminate or restrict competition, weakening the port economic vitality. At present,
the market mechanism of port operation in China is not perfect, and the port operator
should be concentrated in the scope of anti-monopoly law to maintain the sustainable
and healthy development of the port operation market. By analyzing the European
ports monopoly specific case and the TREATYEU-EC, Zou Yingying, et al. (2014) in
treaty for the prohibition of abuse of dominant market position in the EU port field
case study gave the exclusive behavior guide on the market segmentation, dominance,
identifying rules, abuse and typical form, in which anticompetitive effect factors are
analyzed, and combined with characteristics of Chinese ports. This paper gives
perfect elements identified.

Forth, it has some theoretical model and theoretical basis of port cooperative
competition. To illustrate, Li Nan, et al. (2007) in the port area of monopoly and
competition: with circle model, using the circular port of monopoly and competition
model analysis, put forward the privatization reform and rebuild regulation scale
such as competition, cooperative competition. Luo Fang, et al. (2010), in Chinese
coastal ports group of the empirical analysis based on gravity model the application
of gravity model analysis of coastal ports in China, points out that the attraction of
core port for other ports helps the localization development of the port; Yu Jinkai, et
al. (2015) in the port competition mechanism based on Stackelberg Leadership
Model analysis for Bohai rima port competition, using the Stackelberg Leadership
Model to analyze the structure of port competition, and the use of Bohai rim port
4

competition carries on the empirical analysis, puts forward related Suggestions on
port group of ports competition in; Zhang Qiang, et al. (2017) in the Chinese port
enterprises' competition between the ports of cognitive research - based on 21 listed
port enterprise discourse analysis of the annual report " for each port listed
companies annual reports in written discourse analysis to explore the state of the port
to port competitive cognitive framework.

2. Competition and monopoly of port industry in China.
Chinese port industry is developing rapidly, but the problem of port monopoly cannot
be ignored. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the current development trend of
Chinese ports, different behaviors of port monopoly and studies on port monopoly by
different scholars.

2.1 Trend analysis
On January 26, 2018, the ministry of transport announced the express data of cargo
and passenger throughput of ports in 2017. According to the data, the cargo
throughput of Chinese larger ports is expected to reach 12.644 billion tons in 2017,
an increase of 6.4% over the previous year. Liu Chanjian, et al. (2018) mentioned
that among them, the growth of coastal ports and inland river ports was basically the
same as that of the previous year, at 6.4% and 6.3% respectively, and the completed
cargo throughputs were 8.625 billion tons and 4.019 billion tons respectively. The
throughput of foreign trade goods reached 4.002 billion tons, up 5.7% year on year.
Container throughput increased 8.3% year on year to 227m TEU and was
significantly faster than cargo throughput by 6.4%. Compared with the
corresponding growth rate in 2016, the above data are significantly accelerated.
5

In terms of container throughput rankings, the ministry of transport has not changed
its ranking from last year and the growth rate is positive for all of the 12 ports with
more than 12 sizes reported by the ministry of transport. Among them, Shanghai port
exceeded 40 million TEU for the first time, reaching 40.18 million TEU, an increase
0of 7.7% over the previous year, ranking the first in the world. Shenzhen port
completed 25.25 million TEU in 2017, with a growth of only 5.3%, ranking second;
Ningbo - Zhoushan port by just 610000 TEU of a slight difference, in Shenzhen, it is
worth noting that the Ningbo - Zhoushan port 2017 annual growth rate is as high as
14.3%, far higher than the 5.3% growth in Shenzhen, or back to Shenzhen in 2018,
becoming Chinese second largest container port. The next four to 12 places were
Guangzhou port, Qingdao port, Tianjin port, Xiamen port, Dalian port, Yingkou port,
Suzhou port, Lianyungang port and Foshan port.

In recent years, the investment scale of the port industry has been negative, but the
new production capacity remains high. The overcapacity is relatively prominent, and
the trend of large-scale berths in coastal ports is more obvious.

2.2 The monopolistic behavior of port enterprise.
Because of the geographical location is different, different ports have different
hinterlands, the competition between each other is not strong. Every port has a strong
market power within a certain geographical area. In other words, the goods in this
area are transported through the local port, which is the most economically
reasonable, leading to the high dependence of shipping companies and shippers on
them. Therefore, there are three general problems in ports

6

2.2.1 Joint restrictions on competition by port enterprises.
Horizontal cooperation among port enterprises restricted competition, including fixed
prices and market segmentation. Fixed price refers to the port in order to avoid price
competition between enterprises. Through the price agreement, it jointly determines
terminal services (services that can set their own rates) can determine the charge
standard of charging standards. Market segmentation refers to two or more port
enterprises. In order to avoid competition, it reaches an agreement to delimit each
other's port service areas and service shipping enterprises or shippers.

2.2.2 Port enterprises abusing their economic advantage to sell
The abuse of economic advantages by port enterprises in carrying out bundle sales
means that when a port enterprise sells one service, it violates the wishes of buyers
such as shipping enterprises and requires them to purchase another service at the
same time. This monopoly behavior impact on some small shipping enterprises of
China is bigger. Small shipping enterprises do not have enough goods supply and
lack in bargaining power with terminal enterprise, which is the larger terminal
enterprise supplicant, finally under the powerful shipping enterprise's competition.
The small enterprise will be out of the market.

2.2.3 The price discrimination of the service provided by the port enterprise
So-called price discrimination includes two cases: one is the port enterprise choice
for its competitors in specific areas or for specific shipping companies, where sales
of its cargo, warehousing and other services; the other one is the port enterprises
which have no legitimate reason to adopt different price standards for several
shipping enterprises and other buyers with the same trading conditions.

7

2.3Analysis and attitude of scholars at home and abroad on port
monopoly
Li Nan, et al. (2007) used the circular model to analyze and understand the regional
monopoly and competition characteristics of the port so that it can provide the basic
theoretical basis for the public policy making to realize the competition of the port
industry regulation model. Port has a certain monopoly within a geographical area,
which is more helpful to obtain the economies of scale and make use of scarce
resources, but market forces accumulated will lead to loss of welfare and efficiency.
While the direct competition between the adjacent ports can promote higher
efficiency and produce competition vitality, excessive dispersion will interfere with
the economies of scale, and may also cause the waste of resources. The competition
between ports not only requires enough port number and the intensity of competition,
it but also cannot damage scale effect. It should avoid repeated construction and
excessive competition caused by intense port layout.

Cui Zhongliang, et al.(2016) mentioned that port competition and cooperation is
attracting wide attention of the industry and research. Port groups united into one,
which can maximize its optimal benefits. However, it’s easy to form a regional
monopoly, endangering the overall efficiency of the logistics chain, so the port group
needs to shoulder its social responsibility, abandon the monopoly profits, aim for fair
competition. Besides, it should combine the development of port with the supply
chain of the city, taking the overall situation, balancing excessive competition of the
ports and monopoly, so as to enhance the quality and promote competitiveness of
logistics chain to obtain the long-term benefits.

8

Li Nan. (2008) said Port industry regulation reform is a comprehensive process of
connotation widely, avoiding goal conflict between the central government and local
government, governing excessive competition between the ports of the governance or
regional monopoly, balancing in different interests of all parties, and the risk
allocation, preventing the abuse of monopoly power and improper anti-competitive
behavior, etc., It’s ultimate aim is to build coordinated and effective market system in
each link of the port industry, to enhance the competitiveness of the port. Port
privatization is a complex activity, linking privatization to regulation. In addition to
the needs of regulation after privatization, the improvement of the regulatory
framework also helps to promote the process of port privatization. Privatization has
changed the property rights of port enterprises. The government can only intervene in
the activities of enterprises through the law. At the same time, the privatization also
calls for the implementation of the corresponding system of rules and regulations, in
order to form and maintain the fair competition between different market subjects
and prevent the occurrence of private monopolies, and so on and so forth, so the first
task to push forward the reform of port privatization is the regulatory framework.
Privatization makes market-oriented regulation policies easier to implement, which
explains that once property relations are separated, regulatory bodies can implement
more just regulation policies.

Liu Liang, et al. (2007) mentioned that with more and more capital competing for the
Chinese port market, some foreign interest groups have completed the strategic
layout of Chinese important ports and presented a monopoly trend. And principle of
economics shows that monopoly is not conducive to the development of the industry,
especially the monopoly of foreign holdings port enterprises, and more damaging. In
macro level, it will affect national economic security, and in micro level will affect
9

the interests of the shipping enterprises of China, the port enterprise and the owner.
Therefore, the relevant departments of the state should take active and effective
regulation measures to encourage the development of Chinese port enterprises'
economies of scale while combating the monopoly of foreign capital.

Basso, et al. (2007;.2013) mentioned that the study of cooperation between two
oligarchs means monopoly, but in practice, monopoly cooperation between ports in
the region is not allowed, and cooperation between ports is often to enhance their
competitiveness through alliance to compete with other ports.

Dong-Wook Song (2004) mentioned that synergistic competition is a moderate
competition mode between cooperation and confrontation, which has become the
critical choice for port operators to gain competitive advantages. Synergistic
competition can avoid destructive competition between ports and strengthen the
power of all parties involved through strategic partnership. Ports in the same region
should expand the overall coverage space on the basis of safeguarding common
interests and following the positive sum game.

From the articles of most scholars we can see that port monopoly will restrict port
economic development, affect the interests of the port of shipping enterprises and the
interests of the owner. Hence, we should break the port monopoly and establish an
effective port system, carrying out fair competition, devoting to long-term
development of the port.

3. The history of anti-monopoly of domestic ports
As is known to all, the waiting time and loading speed of ships in the port are one of
10

the important factors for the profitability of ships. For ports unilaterally command the
berthing power of ships, when ships from the wholly-owned shipping company and
ships of other shipping company successively or simultaneously arrived at the port of
anchorage, the port will give priority to ships of proprietary shipping company to
berth load and unload cargo, which will bring disastrous time lost to another ship.
Because the existing law of China does not stipulate any specific provisions for ship
berthing order, over the years, there is no regulation of berthing, loading and
unloading of the ship order. The port operator unilaterally holds the management,
which is unfair for the ship. Next, this paper will analyze the case of Chinese port
monopoly

3.1 Nanjing port tally dispute
Nanjing Zhonglian obtained the business license on March 6, 2007, and obtained the
port operation license issued by the ministry of communications in the same month,
indicating that Nanjing Zhonglian could enter the port to conduct the tally business.
But in March 30, 2006, Nanjing port group company called regional shipping agency
and freight forwarding company, head of the meeting, at the meeting for Nanjing.
Zhonglian proposes a "three principles". First, do not arrange the ship to dock in
Nanjing Zhonglian; second, do not carry out tally work for Nanjing Zhonglian; third,
Nanjing shipping agent and freight forwarding company are not allowed to operate in
Nanjing Zhonglian. Nanjing Zhonglian failing to complete a tally business in the port
after its opening.
1. Entrusted by Hanxiang logistics, the 25 containers sent from Shanghai to
Longtan port are extracted from Nanjing Zhonglian port, and the Longtan port
wharf side said that the group has clearly stipulated that Nanjing Zhonglian
should be banned. In order to protect the interests of customers, the company
11

was forced to withdraw the order at 4 PM.
2. Commissioned by the receiving party in Belgium, Nanjing zhonglian anchor in
Longtan port wharf tally on a foreign cargo ship for normal business. By 9 am
on the 20th, when 40% of the business was completed, the dock suddenly
stopped the crane and offered to the captain to leave the ship unconditionally as
the only condition for the resumption of work.. At 12:45, the personnel of the
branch were forced off the ship, and then they were removed from the port by
the dock guard and dispatch.

The port maintains a monopoly in order to maintain its tally company. In the
aftermath of the incident, Nanjing zhonglian has made several representations with
the port, but none of them have results. And it also involves complex equity
allocation problem, separating government functions from enterprise management
reform. On the other hand, the government departments can't solve the subordinate
company in the form of administrative commands like these negotiations of business
issues, so the department of transportation, port authority and other departments can
coordinate to this matter.

3.2 Thirteen shipowners' associations set up charging committees
On March 29, 2016, China shipowners association led the shipowner's association in
Liaoning province and Qingdao shipowners' association, etc. twelve regional
shipowners' association, to establish China port charges coordinated action
committee. The port charges coordinated action aims to ensure the legal rights and
interests of the shipowners. The meeting called for the port enterprise, the owner and
the industry organization to set up communication and coordination mechanism, and
strengthen supervision of port charge in advance, matter and afterwards.
12

In this speech, the presidents of various shipowners' associations mentioned different
compulsory charging measures of various ports. Guangdong area ships need to sign a
decontamination agreement, but price is a problem in question. Too big tugboats are
used in Zhejiang port. At the same time, the port side forcibly stands as the agent for
the goods and forcibly distributes the profits, leading to the bankruptcy of some
enterprises. Qingdao port is fully involved in the shipping agency, freight forwarder
and storage yard area. The shipping company must accept the services of port agent
and storage yard, which has damaged the market and is not conducive to the healthy
development of the port.

In the future, the China port charge coordination action committee will collect more
feedbacks from shipowners on port charges and form internal documents for relevant
departments to refer to. At the same time, through the port charge coordination action,
it protects the legitimate rights and interests of shipowners and promotes the
sustainable and healthy development of Chinese shipping industry. It pushes all
members of the unit in step, and firmly opposes all violation of the state council
"several opinions to promote the development of maritime industry health and the
ministry of transport" implementation opinion "behavior, strengthening the social
supervision, restricting port operation of monopoly and monopoly phenomenon,
standardizing the port charges, cracking on illegal charges, to alleviate the current
part of the abuse of a dominant position to exercise monopoly illegal phenomenon
and the negative effect on the shipping market expectations and bad.

The meeting adopted the articles of association of China port charge coordination
action committee, forming the resolution and issuing the initiative. China port
charges coordinated action committee which will be under the guidance of the
13

ministry of transport and other departments, trade organizations, the media, the
enterprise and the joint efforts of the market supervision system established between
shipowners with port channels of communication, strengthening the regulation of
charge in advance, matter and afterwards, to strengthen the social supervision and
restriction port operations in monopoly and monopoly phenomenon, standardizing
the port charges, cracking on illegal charges, alleviating the current port abusing their
own advantages and the negative effects on shipping market and poor expectations to
maintain the market order of fair competition, an effective industry rights and
self-discipline. Through the port charge coordination action, it protects the legitimate
rights and interests of shipowners and promotes the sustainable and healthy
development of Chinese shipping industry.

3.3 Price monopoly case of Shenzhen tugboat companies
On June 11, 2018, the State Administration for Market Regulation of China made an
administrative penalty decision on the monopolistic agreements reached and
implemented by four tug companies in Shenzhen. Ordered the four companies stop
the illegal practice, and respectively four companies related fines of 4% of the sales
from the previous year, specific fines are: Shenzhen Yantian tug co., LTD., was fined
5753549 yuan. Shenzhen Lianda tugboat co., LTD was fined 396,7237 yuan.
Shenzhen Chiwan tugboat co., LTD was fined 244,7201 yuan. Shenzhen Dachanwan
tug co., LTD was fined 689,651 yuan, the total is 128,576 yuan.

The administrative punishment said four offending company since 2010, held
regularly or irregularly a meeting with other towing company in Shenzhen port ,
communicating about the tugboat charges and the negotiation strategies. Because the
punished four companies and other Shenzhen port tug are explicitly stipulated in the
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company's business license the permission management area, which belongs to
different ports. But the eastern port of Yantian, the western port of Shekou, Chiwan
port and Dachanwan port are close to each other. There is more intense market
competition between different ports. The cost of tugboats is included in the total cost
incurred by the shipping company at the port as part of the shipping company's
expenses at the port. Therefore, the competition between different port areas will be
transmitted to their respective subsidiary tugboat companies, so that the tugboat
companies have a competitive relationship.

The State Administration for Market Regulation thought this behavior limited the
competition between the tug companies. This price collusion behavior with the
agreement price instead of market price can let the companies get more profit. It
destroys the market competition and evades the constraint of competition on pricing
behavior. The result is a direct disruption of the market competition order.

At present, the tugboat fee is guided by the government, that is the upper limit price.
Each port can be on the basis of the upper limit price and the customer independent
pricing. In an anti-monopoly investigation conducted by the national development
and reform commission in 2017, it was found that some ports signed contracts with
shipping companies that set the standard terms for services provided by port
subsidiaries. In some ports, there is no option for the tug company in the ship
information declaration system, which is essentially a monopoly problem caused by
the port's failure to set up the window of self-selecting tug company for customers.

Now, due to the imperfect anti-monopoly law regulations in China, related problems
can only be addressed by coordination or penalty. Therefore, while exploring
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Chinese port of antitrust cases, it is necessary for us to study the foreign ports
monopoly case, the analysis on the foreign advanced port system and law, and how
to break the port monopoly.

4. Case study on foreign port monopoly
The regulation of the EU against abuses in the port field is mainly aimed at the
application of market entry and trading conditions in the port. Through these cases,
the application of the elements of the EU's prohibition against abusing market
dominance in the port sector has been clarified and improved.

4.1 Excessive price--The Helsingborg port case
According to the quantitative relation between output and monopoly price, Posner
(2003) revealed the monopoly enterprise's production should be less than that of
competition, and the price is possibly greater than the competition, thereby gaining
extra monopoly profits. The monopoly price is generated in this process. The
European Union's competition law says that a monopoly price means that there is no
reasonable relationship between the price and the product or service it provides. The
court set up two analytical steps to determine the high price of monopoly. The other
is to determine whether the price of a product or service is unfair compared to the
price of a competitive product or service, or whether the price of the product or
service is unfair in itself.

The analysis of monopoly price has been applied to the helsingborg case. In this case,
the port of helsingborg, one of the largest ports in Sweden, has a good geographical
position. In 2004, two ferry operators, Scandlines Sverige AB and Sundbusserne,
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filled a complaint to the commission over the unjustified cost of the port of
Helsingborg. It said the port of Helsingborg charged too much for port services.

The dispute in this case centers on whether the port charges involved are
unreasonable. In the case, the commission reaffirmed its consistent standard that
abusive prices should be prices unrelated to economic value. In determining whether
prices are too high, the commission gives the order in which the three methods apply.
The committee acknowledges that the best comparison should be with alternatives
provided by competitors in the same market. If such an alternative cannot be found,
the same product sold by the same person in another market can be compared. If
such information is not available, it can be compared with the prices of similar
products provided by other companies in comparable markets. When using the third
method of comparison, it should be noted that (1) the provided products or services
should be comparable; (2) the charging system is allowed for meaningful
comparison.

In this case, because of the difference between activities, assets, investment scale and
income level of each port , it is impossible to draw a conclusion through comparison.
The commission also stressed that the price of a product should not only take into
account cost-related factors, but also demand. Therefore, even if the profit of a
product is high, it is not necessary to conclude that the price is unfair. Committee
considered all relevant economic factors, including the sunk costs, port terminal of
intangible value. It was concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that
there was no reasonable link between the port charges and the economic value of the
services. Therefore, it is determined that this port does not constitute monopoly and
high price.
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It can be seen from the Helsingborg port case, when the EU determine whether port
price is reasonable, they will respect different consumers and horizontal comparison
between the ports of the different prices. On the other hand, by using case law, the
price composition and the rationality of price itself are further evaluated. At the same
time, when evaluating the value, the sunk cost of the port side and the intangible
value of the port are taken into full account, which is also a worthy method for
reference.

4.2 Discriminatory price---MERCI case in Italy
Wang Xiaoye (2001) mentioned that in theory, discriminatory ACTS belong to an
independent category of abuse. Discrimination refers to the different prices the buyer
pays when the seller buys the same grade, the same quality of goods, or the prices
seller pays when buyer provides the same level and the same quality of the goods,
which directly affects the other person's ability to compete.

MERCI case comes from the Italian law provisions for terminal company monopoly
franchise. That is to say, all the Italian port terminal operation must be conducted by
the Italian port workers. And hired company should carry out it, otherwise it will be
fined. It is also a monopoly to organize dock operations on behalf of a third party in
Italian ports: the enterprises that organize dock operations can only let the wharf
operation agents with monopoly rights operate. SIGERURGICA, the plaintiff in the
case, requested discharge under Italian law from MERCI, which had the right to
organize dock operations on behalf of a third party. But a strike by local dockers
delayed unloading. The main point of contention in MERCI's case is whether MEICI
abused its dominant position and traded with the other party who needed the service
at an unfair price or other terms. Through investigation and evidence collection, the
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European court of justice concluded that: first, the costs of providing dock services at
other European ports were much lower than those charged by COMPAGNIA to
MERCI and MERCI to the plaintiff in the case. The scope of the fees in this case was
set by the port authority, so it was difficult to determine the criteria for their
calculations. But it also showed that the price was not related to the actual cost of
providing services. Therefore, there is an unfair abuse of transaction price. Second,
MERCI company takes some port users to deduct surcharge preferential measures.
But to improve the other user fees, the same business should be applicable to
different transaction objects and different trading conditions, making the deal at a
competitive disadvantage. It's also abuse. The MERCI decision is a classic case in
which the court applies article 82 (a) and (c) of the treaty in the port case.

4.3 Non-price abuse—Holyhead case in Britain
Vickers (2005) said the non-price abuse mainly includes the refusal to deal,
monopolizing the trading behavior, the selling behavior, the loyalty rebate, etc.

In the early 1990s, the commission's development of the "key infrastructure
principle" was originated from two cases. One is B&I Line Plc. V. Sealink Harbors
Ltd.; the other is Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink. Both cases are about Holyhead
port.

1992 B&I Line Plc. V. Sealink Harbors, Sealink company controls the Holyhead port.
The port supports ferry service between England and Ireland, Sealink and B&I
companies operating in the port of the business, Sealink company in order to
eliminate B&I business competition, modifying the use time of the port. So B&I
companies filed a lawsuit. In the case, the European commission defined "critical
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facilities" for the first time, and held that the port of Holyhead was a critical facility
for trial and adjudication. Commission said if the dominant enterprise with key
facilities refused to let their competitors use or compare to its own, it will provide the
adverse conditions and agree to the competition using the facilities, so as to make its
competitors at a competitive disadvantage, violating the article 82 of the treaty. In the
1994 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink case, the committee extended the application of
this principle to new market entrants seeking access to relevant markets and access to
key facilities. Sea Containers, which also wants to operate ferries at the port of
Holyhead, was rejected and filed a complaint with the European commission. The
reason of suing is that Stena has Sealink company abuse Holyhead port owners and
operators’ dominant market position, which violates article 82 of the treaty. It does
not allow the Sea Containers company to use key facilities or infrastructure based on
reasonable reason and rely on it to protect ferry operator's commercial interests, not
fully distinguishing the relationship between the role of port operator and the ferry
operator. The commission believes that Sea Containers had to add the length of the
strengthening port, or create a new port of their own in order to manage its ferry
business in this line of the road. The two practices on physical or economic is not
realistic. So Sealink has a dominant position in the market for port equipment for
ferry or passenger ferry services within its capabilities as a port manager. To enable
Sea

Containers

companies

to

use

the

Holyhead

port

reasonably

and

non-discriminatory, the European commission has taken interim measures against
Sealink. The case ensures that any final decision by the European commission is as
valid as any case in which the plaintiff is a new entrant and the plaintiff is an existing
competitor.

Both cases involve the infrastructure-port. The owner of the facilities utilizes the
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upstream market distribution status, to interact with the business in the downstream
market competition opponent Settings, or explicitly refused to supply the facilities
used for the competition. It also suggests that the key principle of facilities in the EU
for the main are: leading and control of critical infrastructure companies not only
exists in the upstream market, it also exists in the downstream market, and tries to
avoid other competitors using the facility, in order to realize the monopoly on the
downstream market.

EU applies to these basic systems prohibiting abuse of dominant market position
both in article 82 of the ec treaty, in 2008 the exclusive behavior guide, and the
corresponding program specification, which includes a series of typical cases in the
field of port again. This is of great significance for improving the rules of port
competition in China. China should emphasize the effectiveness analysis method and
encourage competition in shipping rules, but it should prevent the anti-competition
effect caused by the abuse of market dominance. Besides, our country should perfect
the standards of relevant market, dominance, abuse, and other elements. Meanwhile
it need to standardize legal language, apply general rules banning the abuse of
market position system to the port competition, and fully embody the characteristics
of port area at the same time.

5. Chinese port analysis
After analyzing Chinese port monopoly case and foreign advanced system, this paper
will analyze Chinese port. This paper will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
based on the theory of port system and competition, analyzing the competition
situation of five coastal port group from 2007 to 2017, for the port group
construction and planning, providing certain scientific basis for how to break port
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monopoly.

5.1 The data collection
In 2006 “the national coastal port layout planning” divided the coastal ports above
designated into the pearl river delta port group, Yangtze river delta port group, Bohai
rim port group, southwest port group and southeast port group. How to rationally
plan and utilize port resources and promote urban and economic development is a
problem that needs to be solved at present.
According to "national coastal port planning" documents of the ministry of
transportation, based on the concept of port group, this paper break the limitation of
administrative division, dividing costal ports into Bohai rim port group, Yangtze
river delta port group, southeast port group, pearl river delta port group and
southwest port group. Bohai rim port group included twelve ports. Yangtze river
delta port group contains six ports. Southeast port group contains five ports. The
pearl river delta port group consists of nine ports. Southwest of port group contains
five ports. There is a total of 37 coastal container ports (figure 1). Zhanjiang port will
be classified as the southwest port group.

This paper mainly collected the throughput of 37 coastal container ports from 2007
to 2017 as the basic data from China port yearbook (2007-2017) and China port
journal for research and analysis (table 1~5).
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Figure 1 The distribution of coastal port group in China

Table 1 The throughput of Yangtze river delta port group from 2007 to 2017
10000TEU
Yangtze river delta port group
Shanghai port Ningbo-zhoushan port
Lianyungang port Suzhou port Taicang port
2007
2158.25
935.00
200.06
190.00
100.00
2008
2800.60
1122.60
300.05
257.00
145.04
2009
2500.00
1042.30
303.18
239.80
150.00
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

2906.90
3000.00
3252.90
3361.70
3528.53
3653.70
3713.30
4030.00

1300.35
1451.00
1500.00
1677.40
1870.00
2062.90
2157.00
2579.00

387.00
485.00
455.36
548.80
500.50
500.00
470.00
472.00
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364.41
468.50
525.15
532.00
457.08
510.00
469.00
590.00

221.15
300.00
400.00
326.70
300.00
370.60
408.10
451.00

Total
3364.00
4326.00
4489.11
5445.30
6000.00
6581.00
6621.00
6989.86
7326.78
7808.00
8549.76

Table 2 The throughput of peral river delta port group from 2007 to 2017
10000TEU
pearl river delta port group Guangzhou port Shenzhen port
2007
926.00
2109.91
2008
1100.00
2142.00
2009
1119.99
1825.01
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

1255.00
1422.96
1199.07
1550.00
1661.00
1700.00
1886.00
2010.00

Zhuhai port
61.30
65.50
56.39

Foshan port
236.00
250.00
292.20

Humen port
0.00
0.00
2.50

Total
3510.00
3751.00
3421.00

70.27
81.49
81.28
95.00
109.40
121.00
165.36
227.04

305.95
285.00
266.27
270.00
282.96
299.60
310.92
391.00

5.49
15.97
100.00
151.34
229.36
336.30
364.00
450.00

4005.00
4251.00
4003.00
4418.00
4823.00
5123.00
5542.00
5962.00

2250.97
2256.98
2172.80
2327.80
2403.70
2420.40
2398.00
2525.00

Table 3 The throughput of Bohai rim port group from 2007 to 2017

Bohai rim port group
2007
2008
2009

10000TEU
Tianjin port
710.00
850.00
870.00

Qingdao port
946.20
1002.00
1026.00

Dalian port
382.30
450.27
457.65

Yingkou port
188.87
203.00
253.73

Yantai port
125.00
153.00
140.10

Total
2598.00
2956.00
2954.00

2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

1000.00
1158.80
1129.47
1300.00
1400.00
1450.00
1455.00
1504.00

1201.20
1302.00
1330.87
1555.00
1658.00
1743.50
1800.00
1830.00

524.20
640.00
731.51
1000.00
1001.00
930.00
944.10
970.00

333.80
415.00
485.10
529.62
566.47
592.25
601.00
627.00

154.12
171.00
185.00
215.00
236.12
245.20
260.00
270.20

3621.00
3966.00
3906.00
4734.00
5169.00
5235.00
5439.00
5632.00

Table 4 The throughput of southwest port group from 2007 to 2017
10000TEU
Southwest port group Shenjiang port Haikou port Fangcheng port The North Sea port Qinzhou port Total
2007
18.20
32.00
18.00
4.30
4.80
80.00
2008
19.00
45.00
21.00
4.93
6.11
102.00
2009
20.50
50.00
22.00
5.20
10.10
121.00
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

32.02
31.67
41.20
45.16
57.84
72.15
85.00
90.00

60.00
73.30
96.00
100.00
136.71
138.00
140.00
160.00

25.10
26.50
27.00
30.98
32.20
36.86
26.63
30.87
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6.18
7.10
8.02
9.30
10.47
15.00
15.48
20.00

25.10
40.22
47.40
60.10
70.20
94.20
137.40
177.00

159.00
195.00
265.00
288.00
362.00
395.00
460.00
534.00

Table 5 The throughput of southeast port group from 2007 to 2017

Southeast port group
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

10000TEU
Fuzhou port Quanzhou port Xamen port
100.00
102.00
462.70
117.65
120.00
503.46
122.27
125.10
468.00
147.05
168.00
182.50
197.67
223.94
243.00
260.00
300.00

137.00
156.86
169.70
170.00
188.50
201.51
209.15
221.94

524.00
646.07
649.97
800.79
857.00
918.00
918.28
1040.00

Total
856.00
750.00
732.00
820.00
980.00
1025.00
1203.00
1302.00
1363.70
1399.00
1602.00

5.2 Methods select
Market concentration is a measurement of the concentration degree of the market
structure of the whole industry. It is used to measure the difference between the
number of enterprises and the relative size. At present, the measurement methods of
market concentration mainly include industry concentration (CRn), Lorentz curve,
Ginny coefficient, entropy index, Hirschman-Heffendale Index (HHI). Because the
Lorenz curve can quantitatively measure the concentration, the Gini coefficient can
only measure its maximum gap between the industry concentration (CRn) and can
only reflect the size of the top n enterprise market the cumulative percentage of the
total market. These measurement methods all have certain defect, and HHI is the
most ideal method to fully reflect the market concentration. Therefore, this paper will
choose three methods: CRn, Entropy Index and HHI, using the throughput of
container ports as the market share to calculate the spatial structure changes of
Chinese container ports in 2007-2017.
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5.2.1 Method---CRn
CRn usually refers to the shares cumulative number of relevant values (such as
output value, output, sales volume, number of employees, etc.) of the top n
enterprises reflected in the industry scale represents of the entire market or industry.
The advantage of using market concentration to measure market structure is that it is
easy to calculate. However, the disadvantage is that such indicators cannot fully
reflect the discrepancies in the size distribution of enterprises. For example, in 4
enterprises or 8 enterprises, they may be made up of those with similar sizes.
Possibly, they may be made up of one extremely large enterprise and a few other
enterprises with relatively small size. In addition, the index cannot reflect the product
differences of enterprises. The CR4 data of southeast port group is approximate to
CR3, because the container throughput of other ports is small to be ignored except
the three major ports.
n

The formula: CRn = Si
i 1

• Si: market share of the ith enterprise
• n: the number of enterprises in the industry
As shown in (table 6), the CRn Index of market structure classification by American
economist Bain.
Table 6 The CRn Index of market structure classification by American economist Bain
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The calculation results of CR4 for each port group are shown in table 7.
Table 7 The CRn values of the Chinese container port group and the five container port group
CR4
2007
National port group
0.99
Yangtze river delta port group 0.93
Pearl river delta port group
Bohai rim port group
Southwest port group
Southeast port group

0.95
0.86
0.91
0.78

2008
0.98
0.93

2009
0.95
0.91

2010
0.95
0.91

2011
0.98
0.90

2012
0.99
0.87

2013
0.97
0.92

2014
0.96
0.91

2015
0.97
0.92

2016
0.97
0.87

2017
0.98
0.90

0.95
0.85
0.89
0.99

0.96
0.88
0.85
0.98

0.97
0.84
0.89
0.99

0.95
0.89
0.88
0.99

0.93
0.94
0.80
0.98

0.97
0.93
0.82
0.97

0.95
0.89
0.82
0.97

0.93
0.90
0.86
0.99

0.89
0.88
0.85
0.99

0.90
0.88
0.86
0.97

5.2.2 Method---HHI
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the result of Bain's - business - Performance
(Structure - Conduct - Performance) theory, namely the market Structure decides
enterprise in the market behavior, enterprise behavior and decision market operation
in all aspects of economic Performance. The index can comprehensively reflect the
number and relative size of the enterprise.
N

N

i 1

i 1

The formula: HHI   ( X i / X ) 2   Si2
• X -- the total size of the market
• Xi -- the scale of enterprise I
• Si = Xi/X -- market share of the ith enterprise
• n -- the number of enterprises in the industry
When 1/n ≤HHI≤1, When n is infinity, HHI goes to zero. When HHI tends to 1,
the port system is highly concentrated and some ports have significant competitive
advantages. When HHI goes to 1/n, the port is scattered and the competition between
the ports is encouraged.

The HHI indicators set by U.S. department of justice are as follows
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Table 8 The HHI indicators issued by U.S. department of justice

The calculation results of the HHI value of each port group are shown in table 9.
Table 9 The HHI values of the Chinese container port group and the five container port group
HHI
2007
National port group
0.33
Yangtze river delta port group 0.40
Pearl river delta port group
Bohai rim port group
Southwest port group
Southeast port group

0.44
0.24
0.27
0.32

2008
0.32
0.40

2009
0.31
0.37

2010
0.30
0.35

2011
0.29
0.32

2012
0.31
0.31

2013
0.29
0.34

2014
0.29
0.34

2015
0.28
0.34

2016 2017
0.28 0.27
0.31 0.32

0.42
0.23
0.28
0.50

0.40
0.24
0.24
0.47

0.42
0.22
0.23
0.47

0.40
0.23
0.23
0.49

0.39
0.25
0.20
0.46

0.41
0.24
0.20
0.49

0.37
0.23
0.21
0.48

0.34
0.23
0.22
0.51

0.31
0.23
0.22
0.49

0.30
0.22
0.23
0.48

5.2.3 Method---Entropy Index
There are some differences between the Entropy index and the HHI index: the
weights assigned to each enterprise's market share are different, the weight of the
HHI is market share, while the Entropy Index is based on the logarithm from the
inverse of market share. The two index give different weights to small enterprises.
The Entropy Index gives greater weight to small enterprises and is easily influenced
by the number of enterprises with less than 1% shares, while the HHI is almost
unaffected by this. The lower the Entropy Index value is, the higher the market
concentration. The higher the Entropy Index value is, the lower the market
concentration. Because the calculation of Entropy Index formula is quite complex
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and its value has no direct economic meaning, it is seldom applied in practice.
n

The formula: E.I   Si log
i 1

1
Si

0  E.I  log N

• EI is the Entropy Index
• Si: market share of the ith enterprise
• n: the enterprise index in the market

The calculated results of each port group’s Entropy Index are shown in table 10.
Table 10 The Entropy Indexes of the Chinese container port group and the five container port group
Entropy index
2007
National port group
0.57
Yangtze river delta port group 0.46
Pearl river delta port group
Bohai rim port group
Southwest port group
Southeast port group

0.42
0.58
0.59
0.36

2008
0.55
0.47

2009
0.56
0.49

2010
0.56
0.51

2011
0.56
0.54

2012
0.57
0.54

2013
0.57
0.54

2014
0.58
0.52

2015
0.58
0.53

2016
0.58
0.52

2017
0.59
0.53

0.41
0.59
0.57
0.37

0.43
0.60
0.57
0.39

0.42
0.59
0.61
0.39

0.43
0.60
0.60
0.38

0.45
0.63
0.57
0.39

0.47
0.62
0.58
0.37

0.48
0.62
0.56
0.37

0.50
0.62
0.59
0.37

0.51
0.61
0.57
0.38

0.53
0.61
0.57
0.38

5.3 Results analysis
From the perspective of national container port group, the port group system
structure has changed from centralized to decentralized, and the competition among
port groups has intensified.

According to the data of CR4, comparing the container throughput of Chinese five
port group, we can see that in addition to the Yangtze river delta port group, the pearl
river delta port group and the Bohai rim port group, the market share of the other two
port groups is small, and the five port groups all present the trend of oligopoly type
1.
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It can be seen in the national port group of HHI value, HHI value has declined from
3283 in 2007 to 2680 in 2017. The trend shows that the container ports group of
architecture is transferred from highly concentration to spreading. In terms of the
proportion of port group market, in 2007, the market share of pearl river delta port
group was 4358, that of Yangtze river delta port group 3966, and that of Bohai rim
port group 2366. In 2017, the market share of the pearl river delta port group was
3045, that of the Yangtze river delta port group 3238, and that of the Bohai rim port
group2213. The market share was gradually balanced, as shown in figure 2.
According to the HHI set by the U.S department of justice, the HHI of the national
port group has changed from oligopoly type 1 to oligopoly type 2, while the Yangtze
river delta port group and pearl river delta port group, the southeast port group were
oligopoly type 1, and the Bohai rim port group and southwest port group were
oligopoly type 2.

Figure 2 The trend of the three port group’s market share from 2007 to 2017

From Entropy Index data, we find that the concentration of ports group in China
increased slowly from 0.57 in 2007 to 0.59 in 2017. The market concentration of
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Yangtze river delta port group and pearl river delta port group decreased rapidly,
while that of Bohai rim port group decreased slowly. The market concentration of
southwest port group and southeast port group remained modestly unchanged.

Figure 3 The Entropy Index of the five port group from 2007 to 2017

Based on the above analysis, we figure out that the container throughput of
southwest port group and southeast port group is less than 1%, and the national
container port group is formed into a three-pronged pattern in the Yangtze river delta,
pearl river delta and Bohai rim port group. Container port transportation is different
from general port transportation, not only meeting the needs of the development of
the hinterland economy have resources agglomeration effects at the same time, the
larger the throughput of container port, the port resource gathering ability stronger.
Therefore, under the balance of market forces, each port group will increase the
opening and construction of port resources to compete for goods sources, which will
inevitably lead to the convergence of port functions and vicious competition.

The port system structure of containers is altered from single hub to coexistence of
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multiple center port such as Dalian port, Qingdao port and Tianjin port of Bohai rim
port group, Guangzhou port and Shenzhen port of the pearl river delta port group,
Shanghai port and Ningbo-zhoushan port of the Yangtze river delta port group. In
Chinese foreign trade development mode, the container port transportation and port
transportation are different. The greater foreign trade transit are, the more obvious
attraction of port to resources, which can lead to the development of regional
economy. Therefore, under the mode of port management localization, the port
investment and construction stand as a common method of driving regional
economic development and improving the achievement of the port group
construction and reasonable planning division of labor, preventing the port function
convergence and vicious competition, which is an urgent task to deal with for port
management department.

Hinterland economy is the main factor affecting the competitiveness of Chinese
container port group. Along with the development level of regional economy, the
construction and development of port group are promoted. For example, the
competitive advantage of Bohai rim port group between 2007 and 2017 is weaker
than that of Yangtze river delta and pearl river delta port group. According to the
research, the competitiveness of the port group is affected by the hinterland economy,
distribution network, port competitiveness and cooperation among ports. With the
construction and development of the sea-railway transportation, the hinterland
boundary of the port group becomes more and more blurred, and the influence of the
hinterland economy on the competitiveness of the port group will be weakened.

The development stage of Chinese container port system structure is similar to the
evolution of foreign container port system, which has experienced the stage of
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decentralization, concentration, hub to edge challenge. At present, the Yangtze river
delta, the pearl river delta and Bohai rim container ports group. Architecture has edge
from hub to challenge stage, the formation of multi-center port and regional
container port system.

6 Worldwide port competition and cooperation
After analyzing the Chinese port data, this paper will analyze the advanced
management mechanism of foreign ports. In order to prevent the harm caused by
disorderly competition. foreign ports constantly seek for cooperation opportunities
and strengthen cooperation in the competition. The cooperation between ports is not
only in line with the characteristics of the port industry, but also is the objective need
of development and is proved by international experience. At present, many ports in
the world have adopted the alliance, merger and other measures to expand the scale,
which is the inevitable result of the chain reaction between the world liner company
and the merger development. It also provides valuable experience for the
development of Chinese port group.

6.1 New York - New Jersey port group
New York - New Jersey harbor was the first port group of operation. On the
administrative division, the port of New York and New Jersey port located on both
sides of the Hudson River estuary, belonging to the state of New York and New
Jersey, New York - New Jersey port authority was established in 1921, the unified
management of two port bridge, tunnel, waterway and port. New York - New Jersey
port operation is typical of the landlord port mode, as New York and New Jersey of
public institutions. The port authority authorized to exercise the functions of port
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management, planning, construction and maintenance of ports, leasing to the
professional company management, to ensure high quality and efficient transport
service and port services, bearing the public power and public service departments of
dual role, promoting overall regional competition ability.

Two ports break the administrative division and merger as the port of New York,
New Jersey, relying on the world trade center in New York City, to form the port
authority, the implementation of unified management and planning. Through joint
efforts, it gives full play into the advantages of the port area, forming a unified
competition entity, making the initiative position in competition with other ports,
which played a powerful role of hub in the region. Figure 4 shows the New
york-New jersey port group competition and cooperation organization model.

Figure 4 New York-New Jersey port group competition and cooperation organization model

6.2 European port group: European harbor organization
The EU has more than 1200 seaports, belonging to 20 maritime countries, which play
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an important role in the international trade of the EU and the domestic market. As the
world manufacturing transfer to developing countries, Europe and the world trade
volume increased year by year, and the harbor for the EU economy is also growing,
and the original European Community transport policy cannot timely and fully
reflect the ports and port of the entire EU regional interests. As a result, the European
Union was established in 1993 as the European seaport (ESPO) to coordinate
management across Europe. Figure 5 shows the organization model of port
competition and cooperation in northwest Europe.

Figure 5 The organization model of port competition and cooperation in northwest Europe

European harbor group don't participate in the construction and operation of ports,
emphasizing the independence between the port members to encourage competition
between ports. But by discussing problems of members of congress, they ensure the
overall interests legally to promote the cooperation between the ports, reducing
internal friction, to achieve a reasonable division of labor and orderly competition, to
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strengthen the EU port group of overall competitiveness. Through the coordination
of the European port organization, the European ports are closely linked and
developed in an orderly manner, which is a model of the system. The port system is
composed of different sizes and specialized ports, among which Rotterdam and
Antwerp are world-class ports which ensures the comprehensive development.
Amsterdam - IJMUIDEN group and Zeebrugge port use their geographical
advantages to develop dry bulk cargo, bulk cargo transportation and ro-ro transport;
Other medium-sized ports and small ports, such as Ostend and Ghent, have their own
industrial characteristics, and the cooperative competition of the system port group
has promoted the overall development of regional logistics.

6.3 Tokyo bay port group
Tokyo bay in the Kanto region, Japan in kanagawa prefecture Miura peninsula and
Chiba prefecture total peninsula surrounded, narrow bay from Yokohama port of
Hong Kong, Tokyo and Chiba, Kawasaki, port, Yokosuka port and other world-class
port more, over the years have not excessive competition, thanks to the government
of unified planning, industrial support and harbor city linkage. Japan is island, which
lack in resources, sea transportation and port economy, Japan's ministry is
determined by the harbor act the function of port management institutions, giving's
ministry planning and coordinating the development of the port group of power, to
ensure the port development vision, in Yokohama, Tokyo, Kawasaki, such as unified
entry fees and the use of quay wall. Simplifying entry formalities, to some extent
limited the free competition; At the same time, the industrial development of Tokyo
bay has formed the industrial zone, and the development of industry has brought
sufficient supply support to the ports. In addition, the port group of Tokyo bay can
use the city to promote the development of high-end services such as port tourism,
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leisure and finance, and the linkage of the port city, each with its advantages and the
division of labor, becoming an organic port group. Table 11 shows the functions of
each port.
Table 11 Different port planning in Tokyo port group
port

port level

foundation and characteristics

function

Tokyo port

particular

Newer port; relying on Tokyo, Japan

Import port;

important port

is the largest economic center,

commodity import and

financial center and traffic center.

export port; domestic
trade port; container
port.

Yokohama port

particular

An important international trade port

International trade

important port

in history; a major component of the

port; industrial output

Tokyo and Yokohama industrial area

port; container cargo

is heavy chemical industry and

distribution port.

machinery.
Chiba port

particular

New port; an important part of Tokyo

Energy input port;

important port

and Chiba industrial area; Japan's

industrial port.

heavy chemical industrial base.
Kawasaki port

Particular

It is connected with the port of Tokyo

Import of raw materials

important port

and the port of Yokohama.

and output of finished
products.

Mu Ziman port

A local port and

Mainly to serve the territory of the

Local commercial port

changed into an

Jun Jin iron and steel plant, rich

and tourist port.

important port

tourism resources.

in 1968.
Yokosuka port

important port

Mainly for military ports, a small

Military port and trade.

number of local businesses.

6.4 Haracteristics of port group development
6.4.1 Unified and coordinated
In order to improve the competitive position of its own, blind investment and
construction, lower rate, it thus rob near port of the supply of goods, which greatly
consumed within the port group of resources, not conducive to the overall
37

development of port group. Foreign governments have realized that cooperation
between ports is the only sustainable development. Whether it is New York -- the
port authority of New Jersey, the European port organization or Japan's transport
ministry, the management and construction of the port group plays a crucial role.
They will ease the competition between ports, coordinate the development direction
of the port, and put corresponding policies in place to assist coordination.

6.4.2 Extensive cooperation
The development of foreign ports reflects the unique industrial characteristics of the
port and demands the natural scale and social benefits, which leads to the monopoly
of the port operation activities. Due to the existence of industry barriers, metallurgy,
electric power, agriculture and the army have built their own special ports, resulting
in serious damage to shoreline resources abroad. Therefore, the development of the
port emphasizes on coordination and cooperation between industries, enabling the
development and utilization of port resources integrated the interests of the various
industries, such as traffic, water conservancy, agriculture with both regional industry
characteristics, so as to realize economies of scope, and enhance core
competitiveness of the port group.

6.4.3 Clear division of labor and dislocation development
The government has introduced regulatory measures to prevent vicious competition
from all over the world and avoid repeated construction. Each port has its own
characteristics to achieve different competition and dislocation development. In the
case of Japan, Tokyo has the world advanced foreign trade container terminal,
mainly at the burden of Tokyo and residents necessary living material circulation
industry activity, including wheat, aquatic products, vegetables, paper and so on
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which are closely associated with city life necessities. Yokohama and Kawasaki
mainly import crude oil, iron ore and other industrial raw materials and grain, export
manufactured goods. The import of Chiba is dominated by oil and natural gas,
supplemented by iron ore, coal and wood. The export of goods is mainly automobile,
followed by steel and ships.

6.4.4 Differentiated cooperation
Because of the non-renewable resources on the shoreline, it is very common for ports
to be too near and in the same hinterland, but different ports have different
geographical advantages and different characteristics. Under the premise of market
segmentation, it will be more stable and long-term to establish the core
competitiveness of each other and seek the cooperation field at the same time of
differentiated operation. Hamburg's seaport is close to the Baltic sea, and it is
Europe's largest rail cargo transport, giving full play to the advantages of offshore
transportation and sea transportation, so as to expand the scope of the hinterland. The
advantage of free ports makes it become important transshipment port in Europe;
Port of Rotterdam and Antwerp port with developed barge transportation, through
the channel regulation, bridge up, the construction of the inland river container pier,
also effectively promote the development of inland water container transportation.

6.4.5 Ensure the autonomy of port operation
The government interferes in the whole interests of the port group and ensures the
autonomy of the port operation and the environment of reasonable and fair
competition. Port operations of autonomy can ensure the competitiveness of the port
services. In addition to rate advantage, quality of service and efficient customs
clearance speed, and the establishment of EDI electronic platform will become the
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powerful weapon of benign competition between ports.

6.4.6 Downplay administrative divisions
Port is becoming bigger and stronger, and foreign ports usually break administrative
division limit. Using port group of coordinated development, nature and economic
law in the market competition of port resource integration consolidates the
dominance of hub port, giving full play to the regional port and feed port of the
auxiliary function. It formulates and consummates the shoreline utilization planning
and port development plan, strengthening port group of internal collaboration, to
promote coordinated development of port as a whole, in mutual interdependence in
the hinterland, formation of scale in the complementary.

Foreign ports of practice have proved that the port resource integration can greatly
enhance group of economic agglomeration and industry derived ability, making the
port city from passive into active productivity layout, productivity layout from
relying on the interior resources to comprehensive utilization of the resources at
home and abroad, and creating new economic growth point and the industrial chain.
From the situation of international port competition, port integration is the trend.

7. Analysis of Chinese port monopoly
After discussing the concept and operation mechanism of foreign advanced port
group, this paper will study the problem of port monopoly in China.

7.1 The problem with the running mechanism
Due to the management mechanism and other reasons, Chinese port group is not yet
40

mature, and there are still some problems in operation, mainly including the
following aspects.
First, low efficiency competition of the same quality. The performance includes:
1. In order to gain a comparative competitive advantage, expand market share
and excessively depress market price;
2. Blind and excessive investment has led to the assimilation of the freight
transport structure between ports, and even caused the situation of partial
oversupply in the region, which has further aggravated the competition
between ports.
3. Some of the less profitable ports received financial subsidies and
administrative intervention from the government, which interfered with the
orderly competition of the market

Second, the proportion of feeder lines in coastal ports is too high and there is no hub
port with international competitiveness. In Chinese coastal port groups, the
proportion of offshore feeder routes is much higher than that of ocean-going main
routes.

Third, the utilization efficiency of port resources is low. In the process of resource
utilization, there are many phenomena. The port occupies more but use less. The
private use public land and produce vicious development. As a result, there is no
situation of complementary advantages and reasonable division of labor between
ports in both hardware facilities and software environment, which seriously affects
the overall development of port groups.

Fourth, the management system is not scientific. The administrative division is
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obvious in the port operation, and there is a lack of due cooperation between regions.
All regions develop ports from their own interests, leading to repeated construction,
vicious competition and waste of resources, etc., which are mainly reflected in their
respective policies, thus weakening the overall competitiveness of port groups.

In terms of operating status of the port industry, the center devolved the power to the
local. Then Chinese coastal cities have formed their own port industry. Although
there is a certain degree of competition between them, the competition is not very
fierce. Port group company build and formed products and service network based on
the regional quality respectively. They designated area, standing as regional
integrated monopolies instead of the national integrated monopolies, making low
efficiency monopoly an unresolved problem fundamentally.

7.2 The problem with the concentration of port operators
Concentration of operators is an economic phenomenon in market competition.
Concentration of operators in port integration is also an objective product of port
marketization in China. With the reform of Chinese port management system and
investment and financing system, the whole society has been stimulated to build and
operate the port with enthusiasm. In evolution driven by the laws of market
competition, such as port integration boom arises at the historic moment: survival in
big ports cracks developed choose alliance or acquisition to enhance the overall
strength, in order to get market share; The weaker ports, feeling the difficulty of
"fighting alone", are united to survival. In order to avoid the harm of both sides,
stronger ports have entered into covenants. We should not ignore the negative effects
of business concentration while pursuing the positive effects of business
concentration such as scale benefit. Port integration in concentration, especially in
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the big port share purchase or holding company under the situation of small and
medium-sized port, is bound to further enhance the strong market advantage status of
port operator, to a certain extent reduce the port operation market competition degree,
limit or eliminate competition. In addition, the merger between ports where if it's just
big ports "equal", in order to not only cannot achieve the goal of resource integration
and the overall strength of ascension, but local port operation market competition
will intensify and malicious competition. Furthermore, if signed between ports to
take profits "grab" the alliance agreement, to a certain extent will only further
strengthen port in the local market dominant position, also not conducive to the port
operation to promote the efficiency of the economy and the healthy development of
the port operation market.

At present, the port operation mechanism is imperfect, the port operation market and
the characteristics of monopolistic competition and oligopoly competition, combined
with the port operation market in China has shown significant planning and
monopoly, to some extent means concentration between port operator in China has a
relatively high risk of eliminate or restrict competition. In addition, in practice, in the
face of large port group. the port administrative department is lack of effective
measures to cope with the situation, or need for local economic interests or
investment promotion and capital introduction, mostly about the laissez-faire
attitude.

7.3 The deficiency of antimonopoly law in China
7.3.1 The defects of the multisectoral law enforcement system
The enforcement system of EU competition law focuses on efficiency, while the US
pays more attention to balance and justice, the rationality and controversy of
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procedures. But Shi long (2007) mentioned that this parallel policing of multiple law
enforcement, even in the US, is not considered a good experience. Because two
federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions enforce antitrust laws, they must be
costly and inefficient compared with a law enforcement agency. Wang Xiaoye (2006)
mentioned that it is conceivable that if the United States had established an antitrust
authority today, it would not have established two parallel jurisdictions at the same
time.

Our approach goes further than that of the United States. According to the
《Anti-monopoly law》, the anti-monopoly law enforcement in China is three law
enforcement, namely, the national development and reform commission in charge of
the antimonopoly law systems, industrial and commercial bureau, the ministry of
commerce system part of the content, that is, price monopoly, abuse of dominant
market position and concentration, the antitrust committee to take the functions of
the three departments coordination. There is no doubt that the development and
reform commission (NDRC) systems, industrial and commercial bureau, the ministry
of commerce system of overlapping responsibilities and, in the practice may lead to
long or enforcement in vacuum, it is conceivable that the industrial and commercial
authorities in the investigation monopoly agreements, and the development and
reform commission, price monopoly agreements and cause chaos entanglements. On
the other hand, the coordination with the industry regulatory authorities involves
complex legal coordination and legal interpretation. The problem of coordination has
become a realistic and serious problem in the implementation of anti-monopoly law.
Coordination problems caused the antimonopoly commission the establishment of
the agency, but it is mainly the agency, and standing body set up under the
anti-monopoly bureau of commerce, it is hard to imagine the agency on the
44

coordination problem how efficiency into full play.
In a word, when it comes to the independence of law enforcement, the same
antimonopoly function with internal connection is divided into three parts, which
inevitably leads to disputes and frictions between law enforcement subjects in law
enforcement practice.

7.3.2 The relationship between law enforcement and regulators is unclear
Under the 《Anti-monopoly law》, antitrust authority and the relationship between the
departments of various industries are in a position of full equality, when it comes to
antitrust concerns from all walks of life, industry departments shall have the right to
own completely, just ask for the opinions of the antitrust authorities. Experience has
shown that limit competition regulators to deal with the regulated industry case is the
biggest problem, they were in the supervision enterprise and its competitors or
consumer disputes, they often stand on the position of the regulated, it is the theory
of "regulators captured". When most of the enterprises under supervision in China
are state-owned monopoly enterprises, it is not uncommon for relevant departments
and industry regulators to use administrative power to safeguard the interests of
incumbent monopoly enterprises. Because of the departments of industry and
regulators in power configuration is not to create a competitive market structure and
standardize the market behavior of enterprises as the goal, the agencies generally is
not a strong consciousness of antitrust, cannot adapt to the requirement of antitrust.
Another problem is that China in the telecommunications, electricity, postal, railway,
petroleum, banking, insurance, securities, such as almost all industry in national
economy and people's livelihood more important set up departments or regulatory
agencies, if these institutions apply department restrict competition cases, the
conflicting policies from different departments, not only can reduce the efficiency of
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antitrust enforcement in China it is impossible to establish a unified national market
competition order.

It can be seen that the phenomenon of Chinese port monopoly is caused by the
problems in the above aspects. The problems in Chinese port operation mechanism
lead to the low efficiency. The concentration of port operators limits competition.
The defects of Chinese anti - monopoly law make the government unable to
supervise and standardize the port operation well.

8. Suggestions
By analyzing the above problems, this paper will put forward some specific
suggestions on the problems, aiming at the improvement of the port operation
mechanism, the concentration of operators and Chinese anti-monopoly law.

8.1 To improve the operation mechanism
To solve the problem of low efficiency of port monopoly, the operation mode reform
of port industry should be divided into two stages. The first stage is to improve
horizontal separation and realize effective competition among port enterprises. The
second stage is to carry out vertical split and realize effective competition in all
operating links. The third stage is to carry out open operation mode to realize the
optimal allocation of resources. Such reform can improve the efficiency of ports,
optimize the allocation, reduce the barriers to the port industry, safeguard the
interests of consumers and promote the sound development of the port industry.
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8.1.1 To improve the operating mode of the horizontal separation
The operation mode of Chinese port industry adopts horizontal division and vertical
integration, which is the result of horizontal division of the traditional full-service
integration operation mode of the original port industry.
The advantages of vertical integration model are as follows:
1. Facilitate the planning and construction of roads, railways and other
infrastructure between ports;
2. Conducive to clear division of labor among ports;
3. Conducive to the integration of resources between ports, making up for their
respective deficiencies and enhancing their overall strength.

The disadvantage is that although Chinese port industry has been decentralized and
divided horizontally, there is no effective competition among port enterprises.
Lateral separation efficiency is the key to splitting after the vertical integration
between business free access to each other so as to form the effective competition. In
a competitive environment, enterprises can grow. At present, the port enterprises
have regional monopoly, and the competition behavior has not been marketized.
There is no motivation and pressure for innovation. The introduction and innovation
of technology are basically carried out under the leadership of the government. For
lack of external competitors and competitive environment, the innovation of the
enterprise itself has insufficient motivation. While the decentralization on the reform
of the port industry formed a market pattern of local autonomy at Chinese ports, it
did not form the market environment of the port industry with effective competition.
Therefore, the result of vertical integration planning after horizontal splitting is far
from the demand of the market, so the actual effect is not ideal.

47

Therefore, the first step of port industry operation mode reform is to deepen the
operation mode reform of port industry’s horizontal separation and build an effective
competitive market pattern. The key to creating an effective market environment for
the port industry is to break the regional monopoly of the industry and the
non-intersection of product competition.

8.1.2 To separate the port vertically
The vertical split operation mode aims to realize the competition between different
operating stages, and at the same time, ensures the overall operation mode of the port
enterprise group. Through the separation of vertically integrated management
enterprises, effective competition will be formed in the production of port facilities,
the extension of industries, the operation, maintenance and construction of ports and
other operating stages. It should strengthen the mechanism and impetus of
technological innovation, form direct and effective competition between the port
facility production and manufacturing enterprises, reduce the cost of production
enterprises, and realize the intensification of production. It aims to form a
competitive relationship between technical research institutes and realize the function
of technological innovation and realize the competitive relationship between the port
construction, maintenance and operation of different port extension industries and
port enterprise groups.

Specific details are as follows:
1. To separate relevant scientific research units, port construction, industry and
port construction, operation, maintenance and other departments from vertical
integration of the enterprise, to become an independent legal person enterprise;
to exercise their functions respectively; to form operating companies in the
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longitudinal formation at various stages in order to form effective competition
at different stages of port operation.
2. The port enterprise group shall implement group control and manage all
subordinate enterprises

8.1.3 To optimize the resource allocation
Through horizontal and vertical splitting of the port operation mode, the market
pattern of efficient competition in the monopolistic link of the port industry and
sufficient competition in the competitive field is gradually formed. After the splitting
plan went through the role of market mechanism, the splitting enterprises tend to
rearrange, merger and purchase another, so as to form a brand new pattern of market.
Industry market is fully opened at this time, the operation mode of the enterprise
further evolved into open one with more perfect competition.

The basic features of the open operation mode are: In the market competition
mechanism, the port industry is competitive, the technology and knowledge is
intensive, the competition between the enterprises has more performance for the
competition of technology innovation. The operation mode of the port industry
shows new trends. Maintenance and service network greatly reduce the transaction
costs and operating costs, due to the upgrading of technology, speeding up of
innovation and application as well as the information transmission. It cut costs of the
mutual information transparency, between making maintenance and service of
network.

49

The competitive efficiency gains brought by adding a maintenance and service
network could be greater than the increased investment costs, operating costs, the
organization cost and transaction cost owing to it, making it possible to run a
competitive network.

Between the production and manufacturing enterprises of port facilities,
infrastructure extended products. It has evolved into a relationship of both
competition and cooperation, which is the result of the deepening of competition and
the specialization of labor division. Enterprises give full play to their respective
advantages and form a differentiated situation of both competition and cooperation.
Borderless cooperation will make haste to change traditional port industry economy,
division of labor further refinement, industrial chain extending, each enterprise on
the chain to find their place. Through cooperation, win-win and competition, it is
possible for port enterprises to form the market structure of oligopoly based on
competition through competition and integration. It is worth pointing out that based
on competitive oligopolistic market structure is on the basis of the experience of the
port industry development, and implementation process of evolution. A competitive
market is the "survival of the fittest", "the strong constant strong" fully embodying
the basic principles of market economy. It has experienced the process, to effectively
implement comprehensive port enterprise big and strong, professional enterprise
small and designed goal. Through the monopoly market structure, competition
behavior is better than that of perfect competition market structure. It is the
embodiment of the realization of the economic efficiency and, can achieve the
optimal allocation of resources. The real economy achieves scale economy, scope
economy and industry economy
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8.2 To improve the system of concentration of port operators
Business concentration is not a natural malignancy of law. It is anti-market economy
to exclude business concentration. A benign and healthy development of the market
structure, market concentration should be controlled within a certain range, both to
prevent the monopoly caused by too few operators. Besides, it should avoid that the
concentration of operators which keep in line with the economy of scale and not
disturb completion are impeded.

Similarly, port scale economic benefit brought by the concentration play an active
role in benign and healthy development of the port operation market in China. It
optimizes the integration of regional port resource allocation and therefore promotes
port competitiveness in China. At the same time, we should also be soberly aware
that port concentration is both a blessing and a curse. Excessive concentration degree
will reduce the port operation market competition, eliminate or restrict competition,
weaken the port economic vitality. Port management in China especially in the
current market mechanism is imperfect. It is necessary to bring port operator
concentration into the anti-monopoly law regulation, at the same time to set up
regulatory agencies to defend the adverse effects in advance. These effects may
include hindering fair market competition, weakening the economy efficiency,
influencing consumer interests and social public interests in the integration of port
concentration. This action may ensure sustainable and healthy development of the
port business in China market. At last it displays that port is fundamental, public and
providing service for the national economy and social development.

8.2.1 Substantive review
On the issue of the declaration of concentration, 《implementation of the state
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council on operators of centralized declaration for the regulation of standard》
announced on August 3, 2008 has been clear about the operators of centralized
declaration for the turnover of the standard. Chinese law of port and the port
operation and management regulations stipulated rules that the port operator shall
provide statistical data and information about legal obligation, therefore the turnover
of port operator to participate in it is not difficult to determine.

In addition, the regulations set up "the concentration of the declaration did not meet
the standards, the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the state council that
may eliminate or restrict competition effect, in accordance with the provisions of
these regulations may require the operator to declare" out of the terms and conditions.
In practice, it is difficult to determine the "possible exclusion and limitation of
competition effect" of business concentration. Due to both positive role and negative
influence of market competition concentration, to avoid subjective mistakes and a
potential moral hazard, we should consider these factors into account, such as the
port operation market access, the market share of port operator who participate in the
concentration, consumer interests and the influence of national economy. The
operator concentration in the integration of port should be judged properly and
reasonably.

8.2.2 Port operation market access analysis
In port operation market, due to the natural monopoly of port in terms of
geographical location, water depth and the large investment, long payback period, its
operation requires a certain scale, and easily causes capital barriers to companies
with poor capacity and small scale. In addition, these small enterprises still face
certain policy barriers to enter the market. The 2008 Nanjing port "cargo tally
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contest" also shows that it is difficult for smaller enterprises to enter the port cargo
tally market. Thus, it is easy to conclude that although port operation market access
in China has expanded from the law, port operation market in China is still a high
barriers of the market, due to special natural attribute and long-term influence of plan
management and state-owned monopolies. New operators to enter the market is
facing a difficult market environment, the original market structure is quite stable.
Therefore, it is necessary to carry out prudent verification on the concentration of
original operators in the port operation market.

8.2.3 Participate in determining market share of port operators
The antimonopoly laws of various countries usually take market share as an
important sign to judge the market status of enterprises and take it as an important
factor to evaluate the concentration of operators. As for port operator's market share,
we should not decide it only according to the turnover or a single index. Instead, we
should consider investment trends (foreign direct investment, port), port throughput
(container throughput and cargo throughput), port operation capacity (port service,
port loading and unloading rate, the port bridge cranes, port berths, berthing ships),
port finances (port total assets, total profit), ports, natural conditions draft (port, port
location advantage), and other important indicators. Especially it is important to note
that in the port operation market, the port draft, location advantages and port service
belongs to scarce public resources. In the allocation of the market, it is not the
relationship between the pair. If after integration, deep water coastline, fine port,
routes, such as scarce resources are under control. The port operator with superior
port resources is more popular with customers. It will lead to increased market share
of port operator who participates in concentration, while market share of these who
do not participate in the concentration is obvious less. Then the possible situation
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should be intervened or prohibited by the anti-monopoly law. In general, the port
operator not prohibited is concentrated, the impact should be controlled in the
concentration of port operator. If it had the obvious overflow if the external effect of
squeezing other ports operator of living space, it can be regarded as a potential threat
to market fair, thus good for welfare of consumers, conducive to the development of
national economy as a whole or other aspect to find justification to support such
concentration.

8.2.4 The influence of concentration of operators on consumers
In port integration, especially in the big port operator share purchase or holding
company under the situation of small and medium-sized port, it is hard to avoid these
port operator who has the advantages such as capital, technology, management and
market of big, in form of a kind of cargo loading and unloading in Hong Kong
business monopolies, and in the same port, different port operator shall provide
facilities and services between the alternative, to a certain extent it can prevent ship
or cargo customers to choose port facilities and service. Of course, we should not
ignore the large port operator’s involvement in development of small and
medium-sized port, such as investment brought by the construction of pier, market
development, routes open and jobs, pay taxes and fees, etc. This kind of case port
operator concentration conditions shall not be prohibited, such as ban big port
operator absolutely holding, after concentrated charge standards significantly
reduced significantly increased or service, etc.

8.2.5 The influence of concentration of operators on economy
At present, the port integration, basically has the shadow of the government-led. Port
integration was pushed by local government, from local or regional economic
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interests, appear even administrative nature of port integration package. Only for
statistical data service of the integration of form, it not only cannot achieve
integration of resources, formed the scale economic benefit, the purpose of
everything in a certain extent, make local protectionism, strengthening local port
operation market monopoly, weakening the port competition, harm to port overall
efficiency gains. At the same time, the need for local investment, small and
medium-sized port investment introduction of large port operator, mostly in
management and coastline of land as a joint venture investment, especially in the
case of the large port operator absolutely holding, hard to avoid foreign capital to
form monopoly, hindering the formation of the competition mechanism between port
or ports, weaken the port economic vitality. In addition, the external port investment
operator and the fundamental interests of the port is not completely consistent.
Sometimes possible investors, operators of profit-driven in opposition to the public
service between ports, coordinated development, thus affecting port brings adverse
effect to the development of regional economy. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent
this kind of possible adverse situation in advance.

The control of anti-monopoly law on concentration of business operators is to
prevent the monopolistic behaviors that may eliminate or restrict competition in
advance, which can avoid the huge cost expenditure and irreparable damage caused
by the relief. Therefore, in order to avoid the danger of excluding or restricting
competition and harming the interests of consumers and the public, it is necessary to
integrate the operators in port integration into the scope of anti-monopoly law
regulation and carry out preventive measures in advance.
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8.3 To improve the relevant legal system
Antimonopoly law is known as the economic constitution law, which is a
macro-regulation to prevent and stop monopoly behaviors, protect fair competition in
the market, improve the efficiency of economic operation, safeguard the interests of
consumers and the public, and promote the healthy development of the market.

8.3.1 To improve relevant laws and regulations on anti-monopoly law
At present, Chinese punishment for antimonopoly behavior is based on antimonopoly
law, while the supervision of maritime affairs is mainly based on the maritime law.
However, it is a pity that neither administrative law nor commercial law involves
antimonopoly of ports and port operations cannot be regulated. Therefore, in the
aspect of administrative law, it is necessary to include the items regulating the
operation behaviors of port enterprises in the antimonopoly law and the regulations
on international maritime transport; In the aspect of commercial law, it is also
necessary to include relevant contents in the maritime law to regulate similar
behaviors better.

There is a difference of the provisions of the regulations on prohibiting the abuse of
market dominance and the legal language between the anti-monopoly law and the
international shipping regulations, which inevitably leads to difficulties in the
application of laws. Moreover, the regulations are mainly applicable to international
shipping and its auxiliary industries, and they are seldom directly applicable to the
port field. Therefore, it is necessary to unify the basic legal terms of the system of
prohibiting abuse in the benign and healthy development of Chinese port operation
market in the anti-monopoly law with the laws and regulations in the port field, and
to reflect the general legal system stipulated in the anti-monopoly law in Chinese
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shipping rules.

The American antitrust law has a history of more than 100 years, and American law
enforcement agencies have issued numerous guidelines in addition to legislation. In
the main text of the EU anti-monopoly rules, there are 24 implementation rules and
relevant guidelines. However, Chinese anti-monopoly law only has the chapter 8
article 57, so it is urgent to formulate detailed rules and a large number of technical
guidelines as soon as possible to make it operable. It is necessary to introduce
supporting laws and regulations, departmental rules and anti-monopoly guidelines, as
well as coordination with existing laws, such as anti-monopoly law and anti-unfair
competition law, price law and industry regulation law.

8.3.2 To strengthen the authority of antitrust authorities
Relative to the European commission’s highly authoritative executive power,
quasi-judicial power, quasi-legislative power. Chinese antitrust committee is not
specific in antitrust cases, it mainly through releasing antitrust guide and coordinate
the anti-monopoly administrative enforcement work, providing the anti-monopoly
law enforcement methods, so the government should strengthen the position and
authority of the antimonopoly commission. Specifically, the anti-monopoly
committee shall have three basic powers, the statutory investigation right in the
anti-monopoly investigation, the independent executive power in the anti-monopoly
examination,

and

the

authoritative

sanction

right

in

the

anti-monopoly

execution----the right to punish and the right to adjudicate. After strengthening the
position and authority of the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency, it will be more
beneficial to the anti-administrative monopoly. Because the enhancement of
independence and authority makes the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency less
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subject to the intervention of the administrative organ and more effective in the
management of the administrative monopoly issue.

8.3.3 To unify the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies
The functions and powers of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should not be
decomposed by various industrial regulatory agencies, which is not conducive to the
unified implementation of anti-monopoly law, nor can they guarantee the unification
of the identification and processing results of the same case or similar cases. In view
of the current situation of Chinese multi-agency law enforcement system, more
communication and information sharing are needed between different law
enforcement agencies. A multi-agency law enforcement coordination mechanism
should be established as soon as possible to unify the anti-monopoly law
enforcement agencies. This will be conducive to solving the current multi-head law
enforcement situation is likely to generate power dislocation, offside, confusion and
other problems. At the same time, it is necessary to establish a coordination
mechanism, a unified, authoritative and professional anti-monopoly law enforcement
agency and strengthen legal sanctions against administrative monopoly.

9. Conclusion
In recent years, Chinese ports have developed rapidly, and the throughput of many
ports is among the highest in the world. Port monopoly occurred afterwards. The
National Development and Reform Commission’s antitrust investigations of multiple
ports also makes us realize the serious port monopoly in our country. This paper
found that most of the scholars in the literature hold that port monopoly plays
negative role for the port development. They also appeal to establish an effective port
system. In this paper through the analysis of Chinese five major port group of market
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concentration data, we obtained the conclusion that the port group changed from
centralized to decentralized, but is still in a monopoly of high degree, and the
competition between ports will be turned into the competition between ports group.
The Chinese port group will develop into a three-pronged port group system with the
Yangtze river delta port group, pearl river delta port group and Bohai rim port group.
Based on the case of port monopoly at home and abroad and the deficiency of anti monopoly law in China, this paper puts forward the methods of perfecting resource
allocation, perfecting operator concentration system and improving the relevant legal
system of anti - monopoly law.

At present Chinese port monopoly problem still has a long way to go. The port
reform is the key to the healthy and sustainable development of the industry. How to
better use resource configuration has important implications for improving port
economy, which also affects the financing capacity of port industry and social
investment. At the same time, it is urgent to establish a unified anti-monopoly law
enforcement agency and enhance its authority.

There are still some deficiencies in the analysis of port data in this paper. The
indicators established by economists on the degree of monopoly cannot fully cover
the whole industry, so it is necessary for us to further study on the establishment of
monopoly indicators for ports.
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